ploy his corps into an army under his, Krymov's, command, putting the Third Cavalry Corps under the command of another Cossack general, Krasnov. The latter reached Pskov when the ill-fated operation was nearing its end and was taken into custody by the local Soldiers' Committee. Two days later he was brought to our office under escort. A tall man of impressive appearance, his gray head held high, he looked intelligent and self-confident. He did not deny his knowledge of Kornilov's plans and his readiness to execute them. Obviously he was guilty of intending to take part in the mutiny but could not be accused of participating in mutinous actions. Stankevich and I decided not to press charges. I called Stankevich into the next room and said to him, "The corps needs a new commander. My choice is this man." He agreed, and we returned to the office where the general awaited further interrogation.

"You may be called later as a witness in this affair," I said to him, "but since it has been established that you did not participate in the mutiny, your personal case is closed." The soldiers who had escorted the general were dismissed and Krasnov was ready to leave when I asked him, "Will you help us reconcile the Cossacks with their officers and restore order in the corps?"

"I would be happy to do so," he replied.

"Would you accept the post of commander of the corps?"

"I am a soldier and obey orders," the general answered.

A few day later Krasnov was officially appointed commander of the Third Cavalry Corps. I introduced him to the Cossack committeemen, and he gave them a talk about the Cossacks' traditions of freedom. He was an excellent speaker, with a flair for martial romanticism.

Then we began a tour of the units of the corps. I explained to the Cossacks that Kornilov had held the purpose of his operation secret from officers. Indeed, they had learned the whole story almost at the same time as the enlisted men, from rumors. This was evidenced by the message of General Gubin I had intercepted on the Luga-Pskov highway. On the other hand, I tried to explain to the officers that, in the tragic situation created by Kornilov's mutiny, the best thing that could have happened to them was to be arrested by their men. "Suppose you had taken your men to Petrograd and ordered them to charge," I said. "They would have refused to fire on their brothers, and you would have had an open revolt on your hands, under battle conditions. Even if they had charged—some ten thousand horsemen against twenty times as many foot soldiers supported by artillery—you and your troops would have been mowed down by men defending their freedom and yours. Would that have been better than a couple of weeks in custody?"